establish or consolidate a principle that states constitute their own authority in and of themselves '. 10 If the received version of Westphalia does not accord with historical 'fact', what genre might accommodate it? An answer is implicit in Krasner's trenchant depiction of 'Westphalia and all that '. 11 He comprehensively rejects the usual depiction and finds Westphalia itself to be conspicuously more a matter of continuity and the affirmation of medieval and Christian mores. Specifically, Krasner finds that Westphalia did not originate 'a new international order, one based on independent sovereign states'. 12 Yet, and this is the rub, he would still affirm a constituent connection between Westphalia and this order with its sovereign states. And it is the case that Westphalia did much to subordinate religion to various delimited forms of political rule, including the 'sovereign' state, even as Westphalia also 'constrained the authority of the sovereign' in this. 13 Not only that, with the state eventually emergent from Westphalia '[t]he positive content of sovereignty, the areas over which the state can legitimately command, has always been contested', and contested to an extent that would counter its claim to an integral supremacy. 14 The mystery is now compounded. Not only does the originary claim for Westphalia not accord with 'fact', neither does its eventual and prime creation, the sovereignty of the state. Evidently we are dealing with a genre different to the historiographic.
MYTH
[A] mythic time for a mythic place. The revisionist literature has its own mantric invocation:
Westphalia is a 'myth', or more pointedly it is a 'myth of origin', a 'founding mythology'.
15
A myth is sacred but also mediative: 'myths describe the . The limits of the worldly origin are evident enough. For Cixous, the enduringly determinate origin is the place of set and secure return to which 'he' will resort, but 'she'
will go further, always moving 'to the unknown', dissipating the masculinized origin yet still being of the origin -of a labile 'origin which always deals with some kind of femininity'.
19
Yet 'his' origin cannot avoid movement even as it flies too near already to the sunne, the dissolving sun. No matter what its positioned realization, there is always something of the origin before it and something carried on by it, and whatever comes after and ensues in relation to the origin will continually reconstitute it. The origin can neither emerge ex nihilo nor 'in itself' sustain a constant completeness. So, the event of origin will be ever attuned to 'the surplus that overflows' it.
20
For the origin to have some 'positive' determinacy, that overflow has to be contained and the seal o'er the yawning catastrophe secured for the time being. The originating event's 'being determined as such does not signify that there is some event in which the "proper self"
would spring forth, like a jack-in-the-box, but that the coming is in itself and by itself appropriative as such'. 21 And if the originating event is to be sustained, there must also be a responsive accommodating of the overflow. In all, and operatively, the myth becomes a generative relation between the appropriation and the accommodation. Put in more arid terms, if distinct nation-states are to relate in and as community, there has to be some commonality between them inhabiting and delimiting each in its very distinctness. If, in terms of the classic conception of international law, states were entirely independent, either there would be no commonality at all or the only commonality available would be one where they were all the same -that is, if we were confined to resolutions within this world. The mythic alternative provides a transcendent resolution in which nationstates could be independent yet in relation -in a relation of communion set in a transcendent reference. In all, and returning to Schmitt, the very schema he would immunise, a society of entirely independent states, generates that 'humanity' he would set in diametric opposition to it.
FEMININE
A puzzle remains: how can the society of independent states and the sovereign state itself assume their vaunted secularity when they depend integrally on the mythic and the transcendent? The prelude to an answer can be found in a return to Inayatullah and Blaney with their noting that 'Westphalia is normally seen as a key marker of the eclipse of the medieval world by modernity', and with their adding that 'the predominant view of the Peace of Westphalia' would see it as 'signalling the move from a religious to a modern, secular world ... '. 34 What Westphalia makes and signals, more expansively, can be drawn out of the recent and intense focus on historical periodization, a focus that has been most conspicuous in scholarly resistance to the utter relegating of a medieval age as the constituent contrast to a modern age. 35 What is entailed in that relegation is the invention of a prior age which the supposedly modern age encompasses and against which it is radically set -an invention what may yet be -its hidden sublime. A reprise and elaboration. The negative universal reference ensued from the transcendent constituting of an occidental modernity. That reference could not be rendered positively in a modernity founded on an immanent secularity, one in which the transcendent was totally relegated. Yet with such modernity, sovereign rule depends on a transcendent competence of normative determination positively affirmed. What goes to generate a distinctly modern law is the inability of a negative reference assuredly to effect such a positive determination. This law, when in the service of such as sovereignty, has to assume a normative determinacy across a universal range, and to do this it has itself to be illimitably open to possibility. Such an illimitable law would be a vacuity free of any constraining content of its own. So, even as it effects a positive determinacy, this illimitable law could not itself be tied enduringly to any positivity. And in its illimitability, it stands apart from the delimited entities which in its instrumental subordination it otherwise serves. And it is in such standing apart that law provides the transcendent point from which positive determination can flow. Law's illimitability, its generative inability to be fixed to any positivity, enables it to effect a transcendence that is 'pure' in its not being implicate with a transcendence that is enduringly positive -a law that 'affirms itself as law and without reference to anything higher: to it alone, pure transcendence. 49 As 'transcendent and theological' this law matches the pretension of the sovereign state, a match that is requisite if law is instrumentally to serve the sovereign state 'in any case ' . 50 Yet that very matching leaves the sovereign state unable to encompass and subordinate law. Its relation to law remains unsettled.
This same transcendent, illimitable law cannot be rendered as the posited, the 'positive', bonded offspring of a Westphalian origin, either historically or mythically. Law, in sum and with Blanchot, is 'absolute and detached from any origin' anterior to itself'. 51 With its vacuous purity, with the incipience of its always being other and exterior to itself, with 'the very movement by which it formulates this exteriority as law', law has somehow to be 51 Derrida (1992) 194.
